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Collection Texas-Style:
An Analysis of Consumer Collection
Practices in and out of the Courts
Mary Spector* and Ann Baddour**
As many as forty-four percent of Texans with credit files have nonmortgage debt in
collection; this is more than ten percent above the national average. The Authors provide
a snapshot of collection practices employed in Texas over a two-year period following the
enactment of new court rules governing the litigation of most collection cases. Using a
combination of quantitative and qualitative methods, they consider data in three general
categories: (1) consumer complaints to the state and federal agencies; (2) court outcomes
over a two-year period along with related demographic data; and (3) court observations
conducted in five counties with a review of the websites for each of the courts within those
counties. The Authors find that for many Texans, consumer debt collection means threats
and intimidation that disrupt their family and work lives. While they also found that the
default judgment rate in consumer collection cases was slightly lower than reported in a
previous study, they found that it appears to be growing, signaling that more work
remains to be done. The Authors recommend a number of reform efforts that include
steps to increase the quantity and quality of information provided to consumers at all
stages of the collection process and to increase enforcement of existing protections. To the
extent that court proceedings remain an integral part of that process, the Authors also
recommend further standardization of court procedures to ensure only valid claims are
raised. They also encourage courts to actively participate in efforts to ensure that the
protection of consumer rights does not stop at the courthouse door.
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Doug Luippold whose work obtaining and analyzing consumer complaints was invaluable. I would like
to thank Will Cardwell, Ryan Snow, Michael Steve, and Jeff Villalobos for their work on court
observations, and Yibin Xu and Charles South and Dr. Alan Elliot of SMU Statistical Consulting
Center for their important work with the data. Finally, I would also like to thank my co-author for her
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Introduction
Texans like to boast that everything is bigger in Texas. Unfortunately,
when it comes to consumer debt in collection, they are correct. In July 2014,
the Urban Institute reported that more than forty-four percent of Texans
1
with credit files had some form of nonmortgage debt in collection. That
is eleven percentage points higher than the national average of thirty2
three percent, putting Texas second only to Louisiana. The average
amount of the Texas consumer’s debt in collection was slightly more than
3
$5000.
One might consider the high rate of debt among Texas consumers to
be consistent with Texas’ long tradition of providing debtor protections.
The 1836 Constitution of the Republic proclaimed, “No person shall be
imprisoned for debt in consequence of inability to pay,” a provision
4
which remains a part of the state’s constitution. In addition, Texas
5
protects significant personal assets from the reach of general creditors
and provides generous homestead protection for up to ten acres for an
6
urban homestead and up to 200 acres for a rural homestead. Texas is
also one of just four states that protect current wages from garnishment,
7
except in limited circumstances such as payment of child support.
Despite this high level of post-judgment protection, debt collectors
in the state use a number of tools, including litigation, to obtain payment.
1. Caroline Ratcliffe et al., Urban Inst., Delinquent Debt in America 1, 9 (2014) (using
data from one of the three largest credit bureaus).
2. Id. at 9.
3. Id. “Debt in collection” as used above and as used in this Article includes all nonmortgage
consumer debt, including credit card accounts unpaid for more than 180 days, payday loans, unpaid
medical or utility bills, and child support obligations. See id. at 4 (discussing debt reported by the
creditor to the credit reporting agency as being debt in collection). The Federal Reserve Board defines
consumer credit as “most credit extended to individuals, excluding loans secured by real estate.” See
Fed. Reserve, Consumer Credit-G.19 2 n.1 (2016).
4. Tex. Const. art. 1, § 18.
5. See, e.g., Tex. Prop. Code Ann. § 42.002 (West 2016).
6. See id. § 41.002(a) (exempting up to 10 acres for urban homestead); id. § 41.002(b) (exempting
up to 200 acres for rural homestead).
7. Id. § 42.001(b). This provision prohibits all wage garnishments except for enforcement of
court-ordered child support payments.
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Beginning September 1, 2013, debt collectors could, for the first time, file
their cases as “debt claim cases” in justice court—the state’s version of
“people’s courts,” where nonlawyers may serve as judges and rules of
8
evidence may not apply. For a twelve-month period beginning
September 1, 2013, more than 147,000 cases were filed in Texas trial
9
courts to collect some form of debt. Of those, approximately 90,000
cases (approximately fifty-seven percent of the total) were filed as debt
10
claim cases in the justice courts. That number grew by more than
twenty percent to nearly 110,000 cases in the following twelve-month
period, even as litigation to collect consumer debt declined in other
11
states.
This Article explores the experiences of Texas consumers
throughout the debt collection process, from informal collection efforts
through the conclusion of litigation. We attempt to assess the overall
effectiveness of existing consumer protections and begin with an
examination of complaints from Texas consumers filed with the Texas
Attorney General and the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau
(“CFPB”). We then analyze statistical information publicly available
from the Texas Office of Court Administration about the volume and
outcome of debt claim litigation together with demographic data from
the U.S. Census Bureau. Our inquiry focuses on forty Texas counties
with populations exceeding 100,000 and spans a two-year period
12
beginning September 1, 2013. We also collected qualitative data from
court observations in five of the counties analyzed and began to explore

8. Until September 1, 2013, there was some confusion regarding the filing of collection cases in
courts presided over by a justice of the peace. New rules effective September 1, 2013, expressly permit
the filing of debt claim cases in justice court, but have no effect in the courts of record. See e.g., Tex.
Gov’t Code Ann. § 27.031 (West 2016); Tex. R. Civ. P. 508.1.
9. Tex. Office of Court Admin., Annual Statistical Report for the Texas Judiciary: Fiscal
Year 2014, at 116 (2014); see infra Part III.A.
10. Tex. Office of Court Admin., supra note 9, at 116.
11. Tex. Office of Court Admin., Annual Statistical Report for the Texas Judiciary: Fiscal
Year 2015, at 44 (2015); see infra Part I.C.1 (discussing other states).
12. This data was produced at the justice court precinct level by the Texas Legislative Council using
the 2010 Census Summary File 1, extracted from the Missouri Census Data Center for population, race,
and gender data, and the 2008–2012 American Community Survey 5-Year Estimates for poverty and
income data. See Standard Summary File 1 (2010 Census) Extract Assistant, Mo. Census Data Ctr.,
http://mcdc.missouri.edu/cgi-bin/broker?_PROGRAM=websas.sf12010x_extract_menu.sas&_SERVICE
=appdev&st= (last visited May 29, 2016); 2008–2012 American Community Survey 5-Year Estimates, U.S.
Census Bureau, http://factfinder.census.gov/faces/tableservices/jsf/pages/productview.xhtml?src=bkmk (last
visited May 29, 2016). The data set is available and on file with authors and will hereinafter be referred to
as the “Texas Legislative Council Data.” Our efforts focused on the justice court litigation because it is
new. As a result, a direct comparison of litigation activity before and after the effective dates of the rules
was impossible. Nevertheless, the results of a study of collection cases (“2011 Study”) filed in Dallas
County in 2007 (“2007 Data”) provide only a rough benchmark. Mary Spector, Debts, Details and Defaults:
Exploring the Impact of Debt Collection Litigation on Consumers and Courts, 6 Va. L. & Bus. Rev. 257
(2011).
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the quality and quantity of information those courts make available to
consumers. The data considered falls into three general categories:
(1) Data regarding consumer complaints to the CFPB and a
sample of 508 debt collection complaints out of the nearly 2000 made
by Texans to the Texas Office of Attorney General during Fiscal Year
(“FY”) 2014.
(2) Court outcome and demographic data from forty Texas counties
with populations exceeding 100,000 as follows:
• 209 courts in 169 precincts in 2014, and
13
• 217 courts in 175 precincts in 2015.
(3) 156 in-person court observations by volunteer lawyers and law
14
students conducted in five counties along with an examination of the
court websites in each of those counties to begin to understand the
application of the rules and the quality and quantity of information
available to litigants.

Information obtained from each of these categories provides insight
into the accessibility and quality of the justice being served by Texas
courts as well as the quality of protection provided by applicable state
and federal consumer protection laws. In short, we found that collection
litigation in Texas grew by twenty percent during the two-year time period
of the study—a rate that exceeded that of other states, many of whom saw a
decline in collection litigation. 15 We also found that the dispositions grew at
an even higher rate, but with disproportionate outcomes across the courts.16
While courts appear to be increasingly efficient, it remains unclear the
extent to which consumer protections remain intact in the rush to judgment.
Part I of the Article provides background information and a brief
discussion of recent federal and state activity regarding the collection of
consumer debts, with a special emphasis on recent changes in Texas law.
It also discusses federal and state efforts to protect consumers through
increased education, regulation, and enforcement. Part II explores
consumer complaints regarding collector conduct outside of the litigation
process through an examination of consumer complaints obtained from
the Office of the Texas Attorney General and the CFPB Consumer
Complaint Database. In Part III, the Article shifts to the litigation
process to consider the court outcome and demographic data. Part IV
considers 156 court observations to supplement the statistical analysis

13. The Texas Legislative Council Data used in the analysis includes only courts that reported at
least one debt claim case in the fiscal year analyzed. The difference in precincts and courts included is
the result of differences in the number of courts reporting one or more debt claim cases in each of the
years examined. See Texas Legislative Council Data, supra note 12.
14. Data from the observations was collated into a single data set on file with the authors and will
hereinafter be referred to as the “2014 Court Observation Data.” References to specific data or
comments will refer to the line number on which the data or comments can be found.
15. See infra notes 56–60 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 121–124 and accompanying text; see also infra Table 3.
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with more detailed information about individual cases. Part V draws
conclusions from the research and suggests areas for reform and
additional research.
I. Background for Report

17

A. Increased Scrutiny of Consumer Debt Collection
In 1977, Congress enacted the Fair Debt Collections Practice Act
(“FDCPA”), which became the primary federal law governing the
18
collection of consumer debt. Thirty years later, the Federal Trade
Commission (“FTC”) convened a public workshop to explore technological
and other changes in the industry and how they affected businesses and
19
consumers. Bringing together representatives of the finance and debt
collection industries and consumer advocates, the workshop took place
20
as consumer debt continued its historical climb. It also took place
against a backdrop of events leading to the economic downturn of 2008
and began a period of heightened scrutiny of practices within the
consumer finance industry in general, and the debt collection industry in
21
particular.
In 2007, consumer complaints to the FTC regarding third-party
collectors amounted to more than twenty percent of all complaints it
received and continued to increase annually both in numbers of complaints
22
and as a percentage of complaints received. Since 2011, when the CFPB
assumed primary regulatory authority for consumer financial protection
including debt collection, complaints regarding debt collection exceeded
23
all other complaints it received, averaging more than 6700 each month.
Many of the complaints alleged conduct that is already specifically
24
prohibited by the FDCPA.

17. Much of this Part is taken from Mary Spector, From Representation to Research and Back
Again: Reflections on Developing an Empirical Project, 16 UDC/DCSL L. Rev. 55, 62–68 (2012)
(describing historical events of mid-2000s that contributed to growing interest in consumer debt
collection).
18. Other federal laws providing consumer protections in connection with consumer credit and its
collection.
19. See Fed. Trade Comm’n, Collecting Consumer Debts: The Challenges of Change, A
Workshop Report 13 (2009) (summarizing the FTC’s 2007 Workshop); see also Fed. Trade Comm’n,
Repairing a Broken System: Protecting Consumers in Debt Collection Litigation and
Arbitration 6 (2010) [hereinafter Fed. Trade Comm’n, Broken System].
20. Fed. Reserve, supra note 3. Data from the Federal Reserve document a consistent increase in
consumer debt as far back as the 1950s.
21. See Spector, supra note 12, at 264–65 (referencing the 2011 Study).
22. Fed. Trade Comm’n, Federal Trade Commission Annual Report 2011: Fair Debt
Collection Practices Act 4–5 (2011).
23. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, December 2015: Monthly Complaint Report 5 (2015).
24. Such conduct includes demanding payment of an amount not authorized by law, harassment,
threats of unlawful conduct, and unlawfully contacting third parties without permission of the debtor.
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That conduct was also the subject of private FDCPA litigation,
25
which nearly tripled between 2007 and 2011. Although numbers of new
FDCPA cases began to decline in 2012, numbers for 2014 remain nearly
26
double their 2007 levels. Through private FDCPA litigation, courts
27
have clarified definitions such as who is a collector and what is consumer
28
debt, as well as collectors’ obligations regarding collection of time-barred
29
30
debt, disclosure of information about the debt prior to litigation, and
31
the level of evidence necessary to prove a debt in litigation to collect it.
Courts also certified classes of consumers seeking redress for statutory
violations regarding misleading and fraudulent collection practices in the
32
litigation process. One court even limited the reach of the National
Banking Act’s preemption, holding that third-party collectors that are not
national banks must comply with a state’s usury laws, even when they are
33
collecting debt originally owed to a bank. Consumers’ success in private
litigation set the stage for enhanced enforcement and reforms at both
federal and state levels.
B. Federal Regulatory and Supervisory Authorities Enhance
Efforts to Protect Consumers’ Rights in Debt Collection
In its 2011 report to Congress, the FTC reported a multipronged
enforcement strategy involving litigation against individuals and companies
FDCPA, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692–1692p (2016). See infra Part II for more detailed discussion of the
complaints.
25. Debt Collection Litigation and CFPB Complaint Statistics, December 2014 and Year in Review,
WebRecon LLC, http://dev.webrecon.com/debt-collection-litigation-cfpb-complaint-statistics-december2014-and-year-in-review/ (last visited May 29, 2016).
26. Id.
27. E.g., Obot v. Sallie Mae, 602 F. App’x 844, 845 (2d Cir. 2015) (noting Sallie Mae not a
collector); Green v. Brice, Vander Linden & Werneck, P.C., No. 3:11-cv-1498-N-BN, 2015 WL
2167996, at *2 (N.D. Tex. May 7, 2015) (noting servicers not collectors).
28. E.g., Eades v. Kennedy, PC Law Offices, 799 F.3d 161, 170 (2d Cir. 2015) (regarding nursing
home debt).
29. Cf. McMahon v. LVNV Funding, LLC, 744 F.3d 1010, 1020 (7th Cir. 2014) (finding offer to
“settle” debt has potential to confuse or mislead consumers about enforceability of the debt).
Compare Buchanan v. Northland Grp., Inc., 776 F.3d 393, 399 (6th Cir. 2015) (holding no overt
reference to litigation is necessary to create confusion about status of time-barred debt), with Altman
v. J.C. Christensen & Assocs., Inc., 786 F.3d 191, 194 (2d Cir. 2015) (finding offer to settle debt without
warning debtor about possible tax consequences is not a misleading attempt to settle time-barred
debt).
30. Clark v. Absolute Collection Serv., Inc. 741 F.3d 487, 490–91 (5th Cir. 2014) (finding collector
must provide details); Haddad v. Alexander, Zelmanski, Danner & Fioritto, PLLC, 758 F.3d 777, 784
(6th Cir. 2014).
31. Alphonse v. Arch Bay Holdings, LLC, 548 Fed. App’x 979, 985 (5th Cir. 2013).
32. See id. (involving robo-signed affidavits); Sykes v. Mel S. Harris & Assocs. LLC, 780 F.3d 70,
99 (2d Cir. 2015) (affirming certification of two classes of plaintiffs claiming default judgments entered
against them based on “sewer service”); see also Suesz v. Med-1 Solutions, LLC, 757 F.3d 636, 656 (7th
Cir. 2014) (reversing dismissal of putative class action holding that venue provisions of FDCPA
required collection suits be filed in smallest geographic area relevant for venue purposes).
33. Madden v. Midland Funding, LLC, 786 F.3d 246, 350 (2d Cir. 2015).
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to remedy violations, seeking civil penalties as well as injunctive relief and
34
consumer redress. In 2013 it initiated or resolved more than nine cases,
an agency record at the time, and obtained injunctive relief in seven
35
others, including cases targeting “phantom” payday loan debts. In 2014,
it initiated ten new cases and continued its efforts to warn consumers
about telephone scammers who masquerade as law enforcement officials
or attorneys to intimidate consumers into paying payday loan and other
36
debts the consumers say they do not owe.
In January 2013, the CFPB began to exercise supervisory authority
over larger participants in the debt collection industry in accordance with
37
38
the Dodd-Frank Act. This was a first for a federal agency. Later that
year, the CFPB issued an Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking “to
potentially develop rules to enhance protection for consumers without
39
imposing undue costs on collectors.” The Notice runs 114 pages and
poses more than 160 questions seeking information ranging from the
quality and quantity of information in the debt collection system to how
40
that information is transferred and accessed. The Notice also seeks
information on validation notices, disputes, and investigation as well as
information about collectors’ conduct in interactions with consumers
throughout the collection process. Before closing the comment period in
February 2014, the Bureau received more than 20,000 responses and also
41
provided additional space for more informal remarks. Proposed
42
regulations are still forthcoming.
Meanwhile, like the FTC, the CFPB continues aggressive
enforcement at all stages of the collection process. In the second half of
2015 alone, the CFPB announced three major enforcement actions. The
first, in July 2015, was a consent agreement with JPMorgan Chase to stop
collection efforts on more than 500,000 accounts and to cease the sale of

34. Fed. Trade Comm’n, supra note 22, at 10–11.
35. Letter from Donald S. Clark, Sec’y, Fed. Trade Comm’n, to Richard Cordray, Dir., Consumer
Fin. Prot. Bureau (Feb. 21, 2014) (on file with authors). As part of a 2015 settlement, the court entered
a judgment of more than $4 million and banned the defendants from the debt collection business.
Separate criminal charges were also filed.
36. Letter from Donald S. Clark, Sec’y, Fed. Trade Comm’n, to Richard Cordray, Dir., Consumer
Fin. Prot. Bureau (Feb. 5, 2014) (on file with authors); see also Consumer Information: Fake Debt
Collectors, Fed. Trade Commission, http://www.consumer.ftc.gov/articles/0258-fake-debt-collectors
(last visited May 29, 2016).
37. See 12 C.F.R. § 1090 (2016).
38. See Edward Wyatt, New Federal Rules for Debt Collectors, N.Y. Times, Oct. 24, 2012, at B1.
39. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, Fair Debt Collection Practices Act: CFPB Annual Report
2014, at 2 (2014).
40. See Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 12 C.F.R. § 1006 (2013).
41. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, supra note 39, at 46.
42. CFPB Takes Action Against the Two Largest Debt Buyers for Using Deceptive Tactics to Collect
Bad Debts, Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau (Sept. 9, 2015), http://www.consumerfinance.gov/newsroom/cfpbtakes-action-against-the-two-largest-debt-buyers-for-using-deceptive-tactics-to-collect-bad-debts/.
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43

uncollectible debt. The second, in September 2015, was a settlement
obtaining $61 million in refunds from consumers from national debt
buyers Encore and Portfolio Recovery Associates stemming from
numerous violations of the FDCPA for, among other things, collecting
debts informally that they knew or should have known were not
44
enforceable. The third, in December 2015, held a law firm accountable
for using the courts to engage in intimidation through deceptive court
45
filings and the knowing use of faulty evidence.
The FTC and CFPB have not been the only federal agencies
involved in protection of consumers’ rights in debt collection. In 2011,
the Treasury Department ordered that banks receiving garnishment
orders directed at customer accounts must take certain procedural steps
46
before freezing accounts to ensure exempt funds are not seized. That
same year, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (“OCC”)
began to explore safety and soundness practices in banks’ sales of debt to
47
third parties intending to collect the debt. Its efforts culminated in
August 2014, when it directed national banks and federal savings
associations to take steps to, among other things, ensure due diligence
when selecting debt buyers and to ensure the accuracy and integrity of
48
the data sold.
Still, these enhanced protections provided by federal agencies could
not fix the systems in place in the states where most of the litigation to
collect consumer debt occurred. By 2010, the FTC concluded many of the
49
states’ systems were broken. It expressed concern about large numbers
of default judgments in collection cases, particularly those brought by
debt buyers who disclosed little information about the underlying debt.
The FTC was also concerned about litigation of time-barred debt and the
50
protection of consumer assets in post-judgment collection procedures.
Noting a shortage of empirical data, the FTC nevertheless urged states—
where the majority of such litigation occurred—to fix the broken systems

43. In re Chase Bank, USA N.A., No. 2015-CFPB-0013 (July 8, 2015).
44. See CFPB Takes Action Against the Two Largest Debt Buyers, supra note 42 (providing links to
the Encore and Portfolio Recovery Associates consent orders).
45. See CFPB Takes Action to Stop Illegal Debt Collection Lawsuit Mill, Consumer Fin.
Protection Bureau (Dec. 28, 2015), http://www.consumerfinance.gov/newsroom/cfpb-takes-action-to-stopillegal-debt-collection-lawsuit-mill/ (providing links to the district court’s final consent order).
46. See Dep’t of Treasury, Fin. Mgmt. Serv., Guidelines for Garnishment of Accounts
Containing Federal Benefit Payments (2011).
47. U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, OCC Bull. No.
2014-37, Consumer Debt Sales: Risk Management Guidance (2014).
48. Id.
49. See Fed. Trade Comm’n, Broken System, supra note 19, at iii–iv.
50. Id. at iii–iv, 14–21 (discussing information regarding underlying debt); id. at 22–31 (discussing
suits on time-barred debt); id. at 31–36 (discussing post-judgment garnishment of bank accounts).
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and take steps necessary to adequately safeguard consumers’ rights in the
51
litigation process.
C. Activity in the States
1.

States Adopt a Variety of Approaches

By 2011, although a number of states already provided consumers
52
with general protection from abusive collection practices, few had
enacted provisions specifically designed to protect consumers in the
litigation system. By the summer of 2011, however, some state and local
jurisdictions had taken action to safeguard consumers’ interests in formal
collection litigation. For example, North Carolina prohibited the filing of
53
a lawsuit to collect time-barred debt. Maryland promulgated rules
requiring that pleadings contain specific information about the underlying
54
debt to give consumers adequate notice of the claims against them. A
California rule now requires a debt buyer to have a specific form of
evidence establishing that “the debt buyer is the sole owner of the
specific debt at issue, the amount of debt, and the name of the creditor at
55
the time the debt was charged off, among other things.”
In New York, reform efforts occurred at multiple levels, over a
period of years. In the City of New York, consumer debt cases neared
56
300,000 in 2008. Beginning in 2009, the administrative arm of the civil
courts issued a number of directives requiring, among other things
enhanced notice to consumers prior to the entry of default judgments,
affidavits of creditors establishing ownership of the debts as well as the
57
good faith belief that the debt was not time-barred. These directives
58
coupled with other initiatives, such as “lawyer-for-the-day” programs
and the development of online interactive tools to assist consumers to
respond to collection cases, to decrease collection cases in New York

51. Id. at 7.
52. For example, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, and Texas all protect a
consumer’s wages from garnishment for most consumer debts. See Nat’l Consumer Law Ctr., No
Fresh Start: How States Let Debt Collectors Push Families into Poverty (2013).
53. 2009 N.C. Sess. Laws 5 (prohibiting the filing of a lawsuit to collect a debt after expiration of
the statute of limitations).
54. See Md. Code Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc. §§ 3-306, 308, 509 (West 2012); Letter from Advisory
Committee to the Court of Appeals (July 1, 2011) (describing proposed rule changes) (on file with
authors).
55. S.B. 890, 2011–2012 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2012).
56. Fern A. Fisher, Ensuring Justice: The Role of State Court Systems in Responding to the
Consumer Debt Crisis, 20 Geo. J. on Poverty L. & Pol’y 509, 512 (2013).
57. Id. at 510–11.
58. The Volunteer Lawyer for the Day Program for Consumer Debt provides unbundled services
to unrepresented consumers for one day only. See Volunteer Lawyer for the Day Program—Consumer
Debt, NYCourts.Gov, https://www.nycourts.gov/courts/nyc/civil/vlfd_civil.shtml (last visited May 29,
2016).
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59

Similar changes were

Texas Changes Rules for Litigation of Collection Cases

In Texas the trajectory for change appeared to take a different path.
Historically, debt collectors in most Texas counties could choose to
61
initiate collection cases in one of several jurisdictions. However, prior to
2013, they were expressly excluded from the jurisdiction of small claims
courts, known to many as “people’s courts,” which barred claims brought
62
by assignees or other entities collecting debts on behalf of another.
Presiding over the small claims courts were justices of the peace who also
63
exercised jurisdiction over evictions and other special proceedings. The
dual nature of the justice of the peace’s jurisdiction had the potential for
confusion, especially for parties unfamiliar with the technicalities who
found it difficult to understand how a single judge could hear a collection
case by a justice of the peace on one docket but could not do so on a
small claims docket.
In 2011, the Texas legislature consolidated the two types of
jurisdiction into a single justice court with jurisdiction over small claims
cases as well as evictions and debt claims eliminating confusion under
64
prior law. The legislature also directed the supreme court to promulgate
65
rules of procedure to govern them and other cases in the justice court.
The Texas Supreme Court then appointed a Task Force to develop a set
66
of rules for consideration by the court’s standing Advisory Committee.
In its report accompanying the proposed rules, the Task Force stated its
goal “was to reward plaintiffs who have all the necessary proof with an
expedient, predictable, inexpensive process, while also protecting
defendants from many of the inherent problems in these suits, including
67
an often disturbing lack of proof.”

59. See Fisher, supra note 57, at 512.
60. See James C. McKinley, Jr., Top State Judge Tightens Rules on Debt Collection, N.Y. Times,
May 1, 2014, at A20.
61. See Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 24.007 (West 2016) (district courts); id. § 25.0003 (statutory
county courts-at-law); id. § 25.0592(a) (providing Dallas county courts-at-law concurrent jurisdiction
with district courts over civil matters regardless of amount in controversy); id. § 26.042(a)
(constitutional county courts); id. § 27.031(a)(1) (justice courts). In all of the courts except justice
courts, entities must appear through an attorney; only individuals may appear pro se. See id.
§ 27.031(d) (providing that corporations need not appear by attorney in justice court).
62. See Tex. Gov’t Code Ann §§ 28.001–28.003 (West 2012) (repealed 2013).
63. See Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 28.003 (West 2012) (repealed 2013).
64. See Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. §§ 27.031–27.060 (West 2016).
65. H.R. 79, 82d Leg., 1st Spec. Sess. § 5.02, Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 27.060 (West 2016).
66. See Final Approval of Rules for Justice Court Cases, No. 13-9049 (Tex. 2013).
67. See Bronson Tucker, Tex. Justice Court Training Ctr., Justice Court Rules Task Force
Report 9 (2012).
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The Task Force delivered to the Committee proposed rules, which
appeared to satisfy its twin goals. The proposed rules contained a
68
number of features consistent with the approach taken in other states
including enhanced pleading standards increasing the level of specificity
69
generally required in Texas litigation. For example, the proposed rules
directed plaintiffs to specifically plead the date of default or last
70
payment, and that third party collectors specifically plead compliance
71
with the bonding requirements of the Texas Finance Code. The Task
Force also unanimously recommended that the court require documentary
proof of an underlying debt accompanied by a sworn statement from the
72
original creditor.
After considering the Task Force’s proposed rules in open meetings
during the summer and fall of 2012, the supreme court published its own
draft rules by order dated February 2013 and its final draft in April
73
74
2013. Effective September 1, 2013, the final rules retained some of the
heightened pleading rules contained in the Task Force Draft, but diluted
75
or eliminated others. For example, although the final rules require that
68. See supra Part I.C.1.
69. See generally Tex. R. Civ. P. 47 (adopting a notice pleading standard in most cases).
70. Tex. R. Civ. P. 577(a)(5) (Proposed Official Draft 2012), http://www.txcourts.gov/All_Archived
_Documents/SupremeCourtAdvisoryCommittee/Meetings/2012/supplementary/sc09282012.pdf.
71. Tex. R. Civ. P. 577(c) (Proposed Official Draft 2012), http://www.txcourts.gov/All_
Archived_Documents/SupremeCourtAdvisoryCommittee/Meetings/2012/supplementary/sc09282012.pdf.
72. Tucker, supra note 67. The report expressly adopted the rule stated in Martinez v. Midland
Credit Management, Inc., 250 S.W.3d 481 (Tex. App. 2008). It rejected the rule of Simien v. Unifund
CCR Partners, 321 S.W. 3d 235, 245 (Tex. App. 2010), which held that an affidavit made by an
employee of a debt buyer offered to establish the existence and amount of debt it purchased from
another satisfied the business records exception to the hearsay rule.
73. See Final Approval of Rules for Justice Court Cases, supra note 66.
74. Id.
75. Tex. R. Civ. P. 508.2(a)(1)(D). Rule 508.2 governs petitions in debt claim cases and contains
the following requirements for cases involving a credit card:
(a) Contents. In addition to the information required by Rule 502.2, a petition filed in a
lawsuit governed by this rule must contain the following information:
(1) Credit Accounts. In a claim based upon a credit card, revolving credit, or open
account, the petition must state:
(A) the account name or credit card name;
(B) the account number (which may be masked);
(C) the date of issue or origination of the account, if known;
(D) the date of charge-off or breach of the account, if known;
(E) the amount owed as of a date certain; and
(F) whether the plaintiff seeks ongoing interest.
Id. In debt claim cases in which the plaintiff seeks to recover an assigned or transferred claim, Rule
508.2 requires that the petition contain additional information:
(4) Assigned Debt. If the debt that is the subject of the claim has been assigned or transferred,
the petition must also state:
(A) that the debt claim has been transferred or assigned;
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plaintiffs plead the date of default, they need do so only if the date is
76
known. Further, the final rules completely eliminated the provision
requiring third-party collectors to specifically plead compliance with the
77
Finance Code’s bonding requirement. The final rules also rejected the
78
proposal regarding documentary evidence of a debt. Instead they
specifically permit proof of a debt by a sworn statement of someone
other than the original creditor, including the plaintiff, its representative,
79
or a prior holder of the debt. In addition, the rules authorize entities to
be represented by nonattorney employees, owners, partners, or officers
in all cases, but only allow individuals to be represented by nonattorneys
80
in eviction cases or upon the court’s determination of “good cause.”
As a result, the Texas rules appear to promote efficiency over
consumer protection by keeping evidentiary burdens at a minimum,
enabling non-attorney representation of corporate entitles as a matter of
course, and permitting expedited disposition without the need for a
hearing. Before analyzing the impact of the Texas rules on debt
collection litigation in FY 2014 and FY 2015 in Part III, we explore
consumer complaints made to both the CFPB and the Texas Attorney
General during the same period. Because much of the conduct that forms
the substance of the complaints takes place outside of the litigation
process, the complaints provide an important frame for the litigation
data explored in Part III.
II. Collection Conduct Outside of the Litigation Process
A. Data from CFPB
In 2013, the CFPB expanded its database of consumer complaints to
include complaints regarding debt collection. By 2014, the CFPB logged
more than 88,000 complaints regarding debt collection, making it the
81
leading subject of complaints received by the Bureau. By December
2015, the number of complaints more than doubled to more than
82
198,000. We analyzed the CFPB complaint database for the year ending
(B) the date of the transfer or assignment;
(C) the name of any prior holders of the debt; and
(D) the name or a description of the original creditor.
Id.
76. Id.
77. See id.; see also Tex. Fin. Code Ann. § 392.301 (West 2016).
78. Tucker, supra note 67; see Tex. R. Civ. P. 508.3.
79. Tex. R. Civ. P. 508.3.
80. Tex. R. Civ. P. 500.4.
81. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, Fair Debt Collection Practices Act: CFPB Annual Report
2015, at 2 (2015).
82. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, supra note 23, at 5. The CFPB’s complaints form a portion of
the FTC’s Consumer Sentinel Network, a database maintained by the FTC for law enforcement
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August 31, 2014, and found 3344 nonmortgage debt collection complaints
from Texas, twenty-nine percent of all complaints received from
83
consumers in the state. These complaints fall into six primary categories
and twenty-six subcategories, including communication tactics, taking or
threatening illegal action, and improperly contacting third parties. All
84
such conduct is potentially prohibited by the FDCPA. Approximately
seventy percent of the CFPB complaints fell into just six categories.
Leading the pack at 26% were complaints about continued attempts to
collect a debt that consumers claimed was not theirs. The remaining five
categories in descending order were complaints that the consumer was
not given enough information to verify the debt (14%), the consumer
received frequent or repeated phone calls (12%), the debt was already
paid (9%), the collections were for the wrong amount (5%), and
collectors used false statements or threats of jail for nonpayment of civil
85
debts. Of the specific types of debt catalogued, credit card debt was the
top source of complaint, at 20%, followed by payday loans at 11% and
86
medical debt at 10%.
Table 1: Breakdown of Top Texas Complaints to the CFPB, FY 2014
Conduct

Percent Reported by Consumers

Collecting debt not owed

26%

Insufficient information to verify debt

14%

Frequent or repeated phone calls

12%

Debt already paid

9%

Wrong amount

5%

purposes. See Consumer Sentinel Network, Fed. Trade Commission, https://www.ftc.gov/enforcement/
consumer-sentinel-network (last visited May 29, 2016). The Sentinel Network includes complaints from
a number of federal and state agencies as well as private sources such as the Better Business Bureau.
In 2014, the Consumer Sentinel Network logged more than 280,000 complaints regarding debt
collection from all sources, accounting for eleven percent of all complaints. Debt collection complaints
were surpassed only by complaints regarding identity theft, which accounted for thirteen percent of all
complaints. Fed. Trade Comm’n, Consumer Sentinel Network Data Book for January—December
2014, at 6 (2015).
83. See Consumer Complaints, Consumer Fin. Protection Bureau, https://data.consumerfinance.gov/
dataset/Consumer-Complaints/s6ew-h6mp (last visited May 29, 2016).
84. See generally 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692–1692p (2016) (covering full scope of debt collection
practices).
85. Consumer Complaints, supra note 83.
86. The CFPB logged more than 473 complaints from consumers in Dallas County during the
twelve months ending on September 1, 2014. Just over 25% of the complaints stated they were being
contacted to collect debt that was not theirs; 13.9% complained that the collector improperly
communicated with them after hours or improperly contacted a third party of employer about the
debt; and 11.6% complained of frequent or repeated phone calls; and 10% complained that the debt
had been paid or was discharged in bankruptcy.
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False or fraudulent statements and threats of jail

4%

Complaints made to the Texas Office of the Attorney General
during the twelve months beginning September 1, 2013 tell a similar
story. They also provide important insight into the problems Texas
consumers shared with their own elected officials and are discussed in
87
the next Subpart.
B. Complaints to the Texas Attorney General
Unlike the CFPB complaints, which are publicly available on the
CFPB’s website, the complaints made to the Texas Office of the Attorney
88
General are available only through an Open Records Request. We
obtained “summaries” of 1908 complaints, most of which were written in
89
the first person and appeared to contain the complainant’s own words.
Because of the richness of the narratives, grouping the summaries
into just one of the six main categories used by the CFPB was a
challenge. We reviewed 508 complaints, chosen at random, amounting to
90
twenty-six percent of the 1908 complaints received. We assigned each
complaint at least one of the six main categories used by the CFPB to
label the nature of the complaints. The results were roughly consistent
with the CFPB data. For example, approximately twenty-nine percent of
the sample involved complaints about attempts to collect on debts that
87. We made these calculations by converting the PDF files to Word documents, then searching
for unique terms for each complaint, such as “Complainant Information” or “Analyst.” The search
revealed the number of matches for each file, which we then used to identify unique complaints. This
method identified a total of 1908 complaints contained in twelve separate files as follows:
File Number
37337
37549
37741
37910
38091
39552
39307
39068
39772
38814
38558
38296

Number of Complaints
208
213
189
116
171
155
144
159
172
119
135
127

88. Letter from Douglas Luippold to Jordan Hale, Pub. Info. Coordinator, Office of Att’y Gen.
(Nov. 12, 2014) (copy on file with authors).
89. For example, one summary stated, “I asked them repeatedly not to [call my job, and]
yesterday [they called] and harassed my boss.” Tex. Office of the Attorney Gen., Complaint 435184,
Consumer Protection Complaint Gathering Summary (2013).
90. See supra note 87.
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were not theirs as compared to approximately twenty-six percent of
those complaining to the CFPB. If a complaint fell into more than one
category, we placed it in every category that was relevant. Table 2
illustrates the breakdown of the Texas complaints.
Table 2: Breakdown of Texas Complaints to Attorney General,
FY 2014
Conduct

Percent Reported by Consumers

Communication tactics

39.5%

Attempts to collect debts not owed

36.6%

Disclosure or verification of debt

21.6%

Taking or threatening illegal action

14.7%

False statements or misrepresentation

9.4%

Improper contact or sharing of information

1.9%

While the substance of the complaints varied, many consumers
reported debt collectors’ use of obscene and vile language, including
91
racial epithets and name-calling, as well as calls to third persons
92
including family members and employers. Other complaints involved
93
collectors who refused to provide verification of the debt, or multiple
94
collectors collecting the same debt. For example, one consumer
reported that a lawsuit to collect a debt was filed even after she
presented the collector with evidence showing she had paid the debt to
95
another collector. Several complaints involved calls to their places of
96
employment, which consumers described as “embarrassing” and placing
91. Tex. Office of Att’y Gen., Consumer Protection Mediation Complaint Report,
Complaint 448085 (2014) (citing debt collector told the consumer to “[p]ay your bills, you ass dumb
black n----r” and “I’ll call your black ass anytime I want you stupid n----r” and that he would “blow
your black f--king head off”).
92. Tex. Office of Att’y Gen., Consumer Protection Complaint Gathering Summary,
Complaint 435140 (2013) (reporting harassing calls to consumer’s husband, elderly father, and
employer).
93. Tex. Office of Att’y Gen., Consumer Protection Complaint Gathering Summary,
Complaint 434385 (2013) (citing collector called repeatedly to collect old debt and refused to provide
verification).
94. Tex. Office of Att’y Gen., Consumer Protection Mediation Complaint Report,
Complaint 436587 (2013) (citing two collectors attempting to collect the same debt).
95. Tex. Office of Att’y Gen., Consumer Protection Mediation Complaint Report,
Complaint 435813 (2013); see also Tex. Office of Att’y Gen., Consumer Protection Mediation
Complaint Report, Complaint 436208 (2013) (making payments on a debt and another company is
attempting to collect on it).
96. Tex. Office of Att’y Gen., Consumer Protection Mediation Complaint Report,
Complaint 449163 (2014) (“I am totally embarrassed and sadden [sic] that now my employer thinks
that I am a dead beat since they have been made aware about a personal issue.”); Tex. Office of
Att’y Gen., Consumer Protection Complaint Gathering Summary, Complaint 435485 (2013)
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97

their employment at risk. A few complaints even came from employers
of consumers expressing frustration with collectors’ repeated contact
98
during work hours resulting in the disruption of their business.
C. Scammers and Collection of Phantom Debt
Although complaints regarding the use of false statements and
misrepresentations were not the largest category of complaints to either
the CFPB or the Office of the Attorney General, they shared a similar
pattern. Consumers’ reports of attempts to collect debts not owed and
threats of legal action often resembled the FTC’s description of conduct
used by scammers or fraudsters engaged in the collection of phantom
99
debt. Consistent with the FTC’s reports, consumers reported callers
claiming to be connected with a government agency as in the case of
someone posing to be an associate with the Texas Attorney General’s
100
101
Office, a police officer, a paralegal, and even someone with a local
102
power company.

(reporting collector actually got ahold of the superintendent, and this left the complainant feeling
humiliated).
97. Tex. Office of Att’y Gen., Consumer Protection Mediation Complaint Report,
Complaint 448045 (2014) (“MY EMPLOYER IS THREATENING TO TERMINATE ME SIMPLY
BECAUSE THEY ARE TIRED OF RECEIVING CALLS.”); see also Tex. Office of Att’y Gen.,
Consumer Protection Mediation Complaint Report, Complaint 439094 (2013) (noting consumer
reported being “beyond outraged” after receiving calls at work and eventually paid debt to avoid
threatened felony charge, only to have collector call back four days later to tell consumer’s supervisor
“they should be careful with me because I could be a threat to the company”).
98. Tex. Office of Att’y Gen., Consumer Protection Mediation Complaint Report,
Complaint 440165 (2013) (“One of our employees owes money to a business” and when “we tell them
that the person they need to speak with is not here[] and we do not take calls for collections[,]. . .
[t]hey then call continually for several minutes, (up to 30 minutes). We have to answer the calls
because this is a business and nothing we do or say makes them stop. This happens every day. . . . Can
you help us?”).
99. See Letter from Donald S. Clark, supra note 35 and accompanying text (discussing FTC’s
actions against phantom debt).
100. Tex. Office of Att’y Gen., Consumer Protection Mediation Complaint Report,
Complaint 439758 (2013) (“Was contacted by someone claiming to be from the Houston Police Dept
[sic]” and “was told that I need to pay more as the Texas Attorney General had not accepted the first
payment.”); Tex. Office of Att’y Gen., Consumer Protection Mediation Complaint Report,
Complaint 440893 (2014) (“THEN AFTER A WHILE A GUY WITH A BAD AMERICAN
ACCENT, ALMOST A MIX OF VALLEY GIRL-JERSEY SHORE GETS ON THE PHONE
AND INSISTS HE IS THE TEXAS STATE ATTORNEY GENERAL.”); Tex. Office of Att’y
Gen., Consumer Protection Mediation Complaint Report, Complaint 447618 (2014) (“I received
multiple harassing phone calls from a Indian man by the name of Brandon Gabriel. Claims that he
was Sr [sic] Counsel with the Texas Atty [sic] General’s office. That there was a complaint filed by a
payday loan company and there was a warrant for my arrest if I did not pay the $1600 restitution. Got
threats from a lady who claimed that she was from the collin [sic] county sheriff’s office as well.”). For
more complaints citing collectors claiming to be connected with government agencies, see complaint
numbers 447677, 447757, 447758, 447797, 447845, 447977, 448100, 448551, 448563, 448788, 448872,
448930, 449518, 449619, 449683, 450106, 454624, and 454937. Tex. Office of Att’y Gen., Consumer
Protection Mediation Complaint Report (2013).
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One consumer reported giving his banking information to a
collector after receiving a call from something called the “Department of
103
Investigation.”
Another consumer reported that a debt collector
threatened arrest and that he would “serve a warrant at [her] job or
104
home, and/or press federal criminal charges.” One collector reportedly
threatened to press fraud charges against the consumer for cancelling a
105
payment and another threatened of legal action when the consumer
106
refused to provide her Social Security number over the telephone.
Consumers reported callers having personal information such as all
107
or part of their Social Security number as well as contact information
108
for their relatives. While it is unknown precisely how scammers obtain
consumers’ personal information, some believe it is a result of sloppy
109
procedures in connection with the transfer of consumer data.
110
Unfortunately, consumers might not realize the fraud until too late.
101. Tex. Office of Att’y Gen., Consumer Protection Mediation Complaint Report,
Complaint 449162 (2013) (involving paralegal with the Attorney General’s office).
102. Tex. Office of Att’y Gen., Consumer Protection Mediation Complaint Report,
Complaint 436273 (2013) (impersonating a TXU official).
103. Tex. Office of Att’y Gen., Consumer Protection Mediation Complaint Report,
Complaint 435673 (2013) (“[Clinton Smith] [r]eceived a call from Department of Investigation and
said they were holding an arrest warrent [sic] for me in regards to a payday loan from about 8 years
ago. [Smith] advised that [he] had resolved the issue . . . [and] was transferred from the operator to Jim
Foster that advised that [Smith] had two options[:] pay [$1355.44] or face an arrest warrant. [Foster]
was willing to accept [$]438.44 and [$]239.28 in 15 days and the remaining 50% in 30 days. [Smith]
didn’t feel comfortable but had already given the banking info [sic]. . . . [Smith] recalled [his]
permission but [Foster] said what is done is done and if the card doesn’t charge [Smith] would be
arrested [that] afternoon.”).
104. Tex. Office of Att’y Gen., Consumer Protection Mediation Complaint Report, Complaint
442830 (2014).
105. Tex. Office of Att’y Gen., Consumer Protection Mediation Complaint Report, Complaint
438049 (2014) (threatening fraud charges for canceling payment).
106. Tex. Office of Att’y Gen., Consumer Protection Mediation Complaint Report, Complaint
437663 (2013) (refusing to provide the debt collector with her social security number, and the debt collector
said that the consumer was being uncooperative and that an agent would be there to serve her).
107. For complaints of callers having the consumer’s entire social security number, see Tex. Office
of Att’y Gen., Consumer Protection Mediation Complaint Report, Complaints 434826, 448930,
449683, 439318 (2014). For complaints of callers having the consumer’s last four digits of the
consumer’s social security number, see Tex. Office of Att’y Gen., Consumer Protection Mediation
Complaint Report, Complaints 447977, 438164, 439208 (2014).
108. Tex. Office of Att’y Gen., Consumer Protection Mediation Complaint Report,
Complaint 436057 (2013) (complaining that collector knew her name, employer’s name, address, work
number, and Social Security number, and that she was delinquent on a payday loan).
109. See, e.g., CFPB Takes Action Against Lead Aggregators for Online Trafficking of Personal
Information, Consumer Fin. Protection Bureau (Dec. 17, 2015), http://www.consumerfinance.gov/
newsroom/cfpb-takes-action-against-lead-aggregators-for-online-trafficking-of-personal-information/.
110. In at least one case a lawyer reported that his name was being used without his permission.
Tex. Office of Attorney Gen., Consumer Protection Mediation Complaint Report, Complaint
449574 (2014). His complaint stated that “a concerned Texan” sent him an e-mail notifying him that a
debt collector was pretending to be him; by the time of the attorney’s complaint to the Attorney
General, he had received calls from more than twenty people calling him about the scam. Id. The
complaint stated “some scammers are calling people trying to get information and money using the
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This was true for one woman who paid the caller after receiving threats
111
of wage garnishment, a practice generally prohibited under Texas law.
The complaints contained evidence of fraud in other contexts as
well, including complaints regarding accounts created as a result of
112
identity theft. One consumer complained that the collectors were so
effective that family members of the consumer paid a debt that was not
113
hers.
Consumers can find it difficult to discern the illegitimate fraudster
from the unscrupulous collector. For example, it is considered a wrongful
use of the courts to criminally prosecute a debtor for a bad check when
114
the check is given in connection with a preexisting loan. Nevertheless,
one recent study showed that payday lenders and collectors pursuing
legitimate debts improperly prosecuted consumers for bad checks in
115
some Texas justice courts at an alarming rate. Although legitimate
collectors attempt to distance themselves from this conduct, it can be
frightening for the consumer who has no way of knowing whether the
threatened court action may actually take place. This is especially true
because court action in the form of a civil lawsuit can be the next
116
legitimate step a collector takes after informal collection attempts fail.
III. Litigation Under the New Rules
Our analysis of the debt collection litigation focuses on debt claim
117
cases filed in the justice courts after September 1, 2013. We analyzed
data collected by the Texas Office of Court Administration (“OCA”) in
118
forty of the largest counties in Texas. Those counties include eightythree percent of the Texas population and eighty-seven percent of all
name of the Texas Attorney General Office and my name as an attorney. I have attached the latest
email. In the past month I have had over 20 people contact me about this scam.” Id. The attorney
explained that when he called the impersonator, the person who answered the phone posed as a
member of the Attorney General’s office. Id. When he asked to speak to the person with his name, he
was placed on hold and the same person answered the phone. Id. When the real attorney identified
himself, the impersonator responded crudely and hung up. Id.
111. Both the FDCPA and the Texas Unfair Collection Act prohibit threats of garnishment and
other actions that are prohibited by law. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(5) (2016); Tex. Fin. Code § 392.301(3)
(West 2016).
112. Tex. Office of Att’y Gen., Consumer Protection Mediation Complaint Report,
Complaint 43428 (2013); see also Tex. Office of Att’y Gen., Consumer Protection Mediation
Complaint Report, Complaint 437095 (2013) (involving propane account).
113. Tex. Office of Att’y Gen., Consumer Protection Mediation Complaint Report,
Complaint 436315 (2013).
114. Letter from Deborah Fowler, Deputy Dir. and Ann Baddour, Dir., Fair Fin. Servs. Program,
Texas Appleseed, to Richard Cordray, Dir., Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau et al. (Dec. 17, 2014) (on file
with authors).
115. Id. at 1.
116. Tex. Office of Court Admin., supra note 9.
117. We excluded collection cases in the county and district courts.
118. Tex. Office of Court Admin., supra note 9.

Spector-Baddour_20 (Dukanovic).DOC (Do Not Delete)

1446

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

6/19/2016 12:20 PM

[Vol. 67:1427
119

justice court debt claim dispositions for each of the two years. We also
considered U.S. Census data for each of the justice court precincts
examined in an effort to analyze possible associations between precinct
120
demographic characteristics and court outcomes. Although perfect
comparisons with data examined in the 2011 Study are not possible, the
latter provides a rough benchmark for assessing the results of the new
court data analyzed in this study.
A. Overview of Court Data
The OCA reported 147,191 new debt collection cases filed in all
Texas courts in FY 2014, with slightly more than 90,000 filed as debt
121
claim cases in justice courts alone. In FY 2015, the total number of suits
filed to collect a debt statewide grew by approximately fifteen percent to
170,409, while the number filed in justice courts alone grew by nearly
122
twenty-two percent to 109,888. The number of debt claim dispositions
also grew, with a total of 115,847 in all courts in 2014 to 153,920 in 2015,
reflecting a thirty-three percent increase. Debt claims dispositions in
justice courts grew at a faster rate, from 45,682 to 77,928 in 2015, reflecting a
seventy-one percent increase.
There was significant variation in the number of debt claim
dispositions by individual justice courts, ranging from one to more than
3000 in a one-year period. Some of this disparity in caseload might be
due to differences in population at the precinct level. The Texas
Constitution establishes ranges for the number of justice court precincts
required in a county based on county population, but leaves the decision
of the exact number and borders of the precincts to the County
123
Commissioners and the County Commissioners’ Court. The precinct
populations in this study ranged from 2409 to over one million, with an

119. According to the 2010 U.S. Census, the Texas population is 25,145,561. See American Fact
Finder, U.S. Census Bureau, http://factfinder.census.gov (last visited May 29, 2016). The forty counties
in this study have a total population of 20,803,802. The Texas Office of Court Administration lists
54,407 debt claim dispositions for the state of Texas for the 2014 study period and 92,520 for the 2015
period. Id.
120. American Fact Finder, supra note 119; 2008–2012 American Community Survey 5-Year
Estimates, supra note 12. The counties included in this study are: Bell, Bexar, Bowie, Brazoria, Brazos,
Cameron, Collin, Comal, Dallas, Denton, Ector, El Paso, Ellis, Fort Bend, Grayson, Gregg,
Guadalupe, Harris, Hays, Hidalgo, Jefferson, Johnson, Kaufman, Lubbock, McLennan, Midland,
Montgomery, Nueces, Parker, Potter, Randall, Smith, Tarrant, Taylor, Tom Green, Travis, Victoria,
Webb, Wichita, and Williamson.
121. The sum is the total of debt claims cases filed in the constitutional county courts, the countycourts-at-law and the district courts, as well as the justice courts. Tex. Office of Court Admin., supra
note 9.
122. Tex. Office of Court Admin., supra note 11.
123. Tex. Const. art. 5, § 18.
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average of 118,864. Other factors not considered here, such as collectors’
124
preferences for one court or another could also play a role.

124. Though selection of venue for debt claims cases is limited by court rules, some collectors
might have some leeway and might opt, where a choice is possible, for a more convenient court for the
plaintiff or a court where the plaintiff has had a large number of cases and therefore is familiar with
the judge and court staff.
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Table 3: Overview of Courts in Sample

Total counties represented
Total number of precincts

125

Total number of courts reporting data
Total dispositions by all courts in sample

2014

2015

Percent
Change

40

40

--

169

175

4%

209

217

4%

45,682

77,928

71%

Mean dispositions by court

219

359

64%

Median dispositions by court

104

155

49%

Maximum dispositions by court

3155

3259

3%

Minimum dispositions by court

1

1

0%

B. General Court Outcomes
According to the 2010 FTC debt collection study, between sixty and
ninety-five percent of debt collection cases filed against consumers
126
resulted in default judgments. The 2011 Study of debt claim cases in
Dallas County Court found 39.46% of the cases resulted in default
127
judgments. As illustrated in Table 4 below, in both 2014 and 2015,
default judgments in debt claim cases filed in justice court hovered
128
around thirty percent, below the 2011 Study findings. Despite the
evidence of improvement, this rate is more than twice the rate of default
129
judgments entered in other cases in the justice court.

125. Some precincts include one court and some include multiple courts (identified as places). This
sample does not include precincts with courts that reported zero debt claim cases for the year. In 2014,
twelve courts reported zero dispositions. In 2015, three courts reported zero dispositions.
126. Fed. Trade Comm’n, Broken System, supra note 19, at 7.
127. Spector, supra note 12, at 296.
128. Id. This study documented a 39.46% default judgment rate.
129. Small claims data offers a helpful point of comparison because these cases are also heard in
justice court and reflect the same precinct makeup as the debt claim cases.
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Table 4: Cases by Outcome, FY 2014 and FY 2015
FY 2014 Cases

FY 2015 Cases

Number

Percent

Number

Percent

Change in
2014–2015

Nonsuited or Dismissed
by Plaintiff

14,567

31.9%

28,921

37.1%

5.2%

Default Judgments

13,572

29.7%

24,636

31.6%

1.9%

Agreed Judgments

5606

12.3%

8231

10.6%

-1.7%

Trial/Hearing by Judge

5042

11.0%

7355

9.4%

-1.6%

Dismissed for Want of
Prosecution

2609

5.7%

4523

5.8%

0.1%

95

0.2%

49

0.1%

-0.1%

4191

9.2%

4213

5.4%

-3.8%

45,682

100%

77,928

100%

--

Outcome

Trial by Jury
All Other
Total

Consistent with the 2011 Study, Table 4 shows that default
judgments were reported slightly less than cases nonsuited or dismissed
130
by the plaintiff in both FY 2014 and FY 2015. Cases nonsuited or
dismissed by plaintiff increased by a five percent margin from FY 2014 to
FY 2015, from 31.9% to 37.1%. Even with the increase, the percentage of
outcomes in the nonsuited or dismissed by plaintiff category is lower
than the 2011 Study findings, which found 53.37% of all cases were
dismissed for want of prosecution or nonsuited or dismissed by plaintiff
131
(with or without prejudice). Those two categories made up 37.6% of all
debt claim dispositions in FY 2014 and 42.9% in FY 2015. In the 2011
Study, cases dismissed with prejudice made up only 2.02% of all
132
outcomes.
In reporting the current debt claims data, the OCA does not
distinguish between dismissals with and without prejudice. As a result, it
is hard to assess whether the decrease in dismissals compared to the 2011
Study is positive or negative for defendants, but the continued high rates
of nonsuits and dismissals is likely related to the often-cited problem of
debt claim cases being filed without sufficient documentation of the
133
debt.

130. Spector, supra note 12, at 296.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Only two percent of dismissed debt cases were dismissed with prejudice. See id. In the Spring
2014 Supervisory Highlights examining debt collection, “[e]xaminers found that in 70% of the cases,
when the consumer filed an answer, the entity [debt collector] would dismiss the suit because it was
unable to locate documentation to support its claims.” Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, Supervisory
Highlight 14 (2014).
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Other case outcomes saw a more modest increase or decrease from
FY 2014 to FY 2015. The remaining outcomes shown in Table 4 (not
including default judgments and those that were nonsuited or dismissed
by the plaintiff) together comprised between thirty-two and forty percent
134
of all outcomes over the two-year study period. Agreed judgments and
trial or hearing by judge each comprised approximately ten percent of
the outcomes and the rate of both outcomes decreased from FY 2014 to
FY 2015. Dismissals for want of prosecution held steady, around six
percent of the total dispositions. Trial by jury is rarely used, making up
less than one percent of all case outcomes.
C. A Closer Look at the Numbers Behind the Outcomes
When we looked more closely at the data, we found the distribution
of the outcomes varied greatly among the courts. For example, although
the default judgment rate averaged 31.6% of all dispositions in FY 2014,
individual courts reported default judgment rates ranging from zero
135
percent to 100%. To determine whether the courts at the upper and
lower ends of the spectrum were simply outliers, we grouped the courts
in four categories according to the rate of each of the top four types of
outcome. For each court category, we then explored the proportionality
of the outcome within the group. The top four outcome categories we
analyzed were: (1) nonsuit/dismissed by plaintiff; (2) default judgment;
(3) agreed judgment; and (4) trial/hearing by judge. The four court
groupings we used were: (1) courts with zero percent of dispositions
falling into the outcome category; (2) courts with greater than zero
percent but less than twenty-five percent of dispositions falling into the
outcome category; (3) courts with twenty-five to fifty percent of
dispositions falling into the outcome category; and (4) courts with greater
than fifty percent of dispositions falling into the outcome category.
1. Nonsuited or Dismissed by Plaintiff
The largest outcome category was nonsuited or dismissed by plaintiff.
In this category we found unexpected concentrations of disproportionate
outcomes in the court groups. Courts in the first two groups, with a rate
from zero percent to less than twenty-five percent, represented thirty-six

134. An agreed judgment is an agreement signed by the parties, which is drafted in the form of a
judgment and signed by the judge.
135. In 2014, twenty-three courts had zero default judgments, and in 2015, twenty-two courts had
zero default judgments. Only one court with two total dispositions fell into the 100% default judgment
category in 2014. In 2015, two courts had a seventy-five percent default judgment rate, with 204
dispositions for both courts. The court with the highest number of default judgments in 2014 had 950
default judgments, making up thirty percent of the total dispositions by that court for the year. In 2015,
the number was 1106 default judgments, making up thirty-six percent of the total dispositions by that
court for the year.
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percent of the total dispositions in FY 2014. If outcomes were
proportional across all courts, we would have expected to find thirty-six
percent of the total nonsuits in these two categories. Instead, we found
just 18.3% of the total nonsuits. Similar results were found in FY 2015,
though the volume of cases in these categories decreased to 13.6% of
total dispositions, and four percent of total nonsuits. The opposite trend
held for courts with nonsuit rates of twenty-five percent or greater.
Those courts represented sixty-four percent of all dispositions in FY
2014, but 81.6% of nonsuits. In FY 2015, courts with nonsuit rates of
twenty-five percent or greater represented 86.5% of all cases but ninetysix percent of all nonsuited or dismissed by plaintiff dispositions. This
analysis suggests that the likelihood of a nonsuit or dismissal by plaintiff
varies depending on the court in which the case is filed.
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Table 5: Nonsuited or Dismissed by Plaintiff Outcome Rate
Analysis by Court Groupings
Court
Nonsuited
or
Dismissed
by Plaintiff
Rates
Nonsuited
or
Dismissed
by Plaintiff
as Percent
of Total
Dispositions
Courts with
a 0%
Nonsuited
or
Dismissed
by Plaintiff
Rate
Courts
Nonsuited
or
Dismissed
by Plaintiff
Rate of
>0%–
<25%
Courts
Nonsuited
or
Dismissed
by Plaintiff
Rate of
25%–50%
Courts
Nonsuited
or
Dismissed
by Plaintiff
Rate of
>50%

FY 2014 Court Data

Percent of
All
Dispositions
Sample

Percent of
Nonsuited or
Dismissed by
Plaintiff
Dispositions
in Sample

1.8%

FY 2015 Court Data

Difference

Percent of
All
Dispositions
in Sample

Percent of
Nonsuited or
Dismissed by
Plaintiff
Dispositions
in Sample

Difference

0.0%

-1.8%

0.7%

0.0%

-0.7%

34.2%

18.3%

-15.8%

12.9%

4.0%

-8.9%

56.6%

68.1%

11.5%

76.1%

80.8%

4.8%

7.4%

13.5%

6.1%

10.4%

15.2%

4.8%
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2. Default Judgments
Similar patterns hold for the next most common outcome category:
136
default judgment. Courts with a zero percent to less than twenty-five
percent default judgment rate represented 33.2% of all dispositions, but
just 16.5% of all default judgments for FY 2014. For FY 2015, courts with
the same default judgment rates represented 22.7% of all dispositions,
and 11.4% of default judgments. Courts with a 25% or more default
judgment rate, represented 67.8% of all dispositions and 83.5% of all
default judgments for FY 2014 and 77.4% of all dispositions, but 88.6%
of all default judgments for FY 2015.
Table 6: Default Judgment Outcome Rate Analysis by Court
Groupings
Court
Default
Judgment
Rates
Default
Judgments
as a
Percent of
Total
Dispositions
Courts
with a 0%
Default
Judgment
Rate
Courts
Default
Judgment
Rate of
>0%–<25%
Courts
Default
Judgment
Rate of
25%–50%
Courts
Default
Judgment
Rate of
>50%

FY 2014

Percent of
All
Dispositions
in
Sample

Percent of
Default
Judgment
Dispositions
in Sample

3.3%

0.0%

28.9%

FY 2015

Difference

Percent of
All
Dispositions
in Sample

Percent of
Default
Judgment
Dispositions
in Sample

Difference

-3.3%

2.8%

0.0%

-2.8%

16.5%

-12.3%

19.9%

11.4%

-8.4%

64.6%

76.8%

12.2%

73.4%

81.4%

8.0%

3.2%

6.7%

3.4%

4.0%

7.2%

3.2%

136. In 2014, twenty-three courts had zero default judgments, and in 2015, twenty-two courts had
zero default judgments. Only one court with two total dispositions fell into the 100% default judgment
category in 2014. In 2015, two courts had a seventy-five percent default judgment rate, with 204
dispositions for both courts. The court with the highest number of default judgments in 2014 had 950
default judgments, making up thirty percent of the total dispositions by that court for the year. In 2015,
the number was 1106 default judgments, making up thirty-six percent of the total dispositions by that
court for the year.
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3. Trial/Hearing by Judge
Trial or hearing by judge shows similarly disproportionate outcomes
by court to those for default judgments and nonsuited or dismissed by
plaintiff outcomes. Trial or hearing by judge court outcome rates ranged
137
from 0% to 100% for both years of the study. Courts with a 0% to less
than 25% rate represented 92.1% of all dispositions, but just 71.2% of all
trials/hearings by a judge for 2014. For 2015, courts with the same rate of
trials or hearings by judge represented 94.4% of all dispositions, and just
77% of trials/hearings by judge. Courts with 25% and higher trial or
hearing by judge case outcome rates represented 7.9% of total
dispositions in FY 2014, but 28.8% of all cases in the outcome category.
In FY 2015, the percentages were 5.6% of total cases, and 22.9% of all
cases with the trial or hearing by judge outcome.

137. In both 2014 and 2015, twenty-nine courts had zero trial/hearing by judge case outcomes.
Only one court with 104 total dispositions fell into the 100% trial/hearing by judge category in 2014. In
2015, one court had a 100% trial/hearing by judge case outcome rate, with just one disposition for the
court. The court with the highest number of trial/hearing by judge outcomes in 2014 totaled 402,
making up nineteen percent of the total dispositions by that court for the year. In 2015, the number
was 717 trials/hearings by judge, making up twenty-four percent of the total dispositions by that court
for the year.
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Table 7: Trial/Hearing by Judge Outcome Rate Analysis by
Court Groupings
FY 2014
Court Trial/
Hearing by
Judge Rates
Trial/
Hearing by
Judge as a
Percent of
Total
Dispositions

Courts with
a 0% Trial/
Hearing by
Judge

Courts
Trial/
Hearing by
Judge Rate
of >0%–
>25%
Courts
Trial/
Hearing by
Judge of
25%–50%
Courts
Trial/
Hearing by
Judge Rate
of >50%

Percent of
All
Dispositions
in Sample

Percent of
Trial /
Hearing by
Judge
Dispositions
in Sample

3.3%

FY 2015

Difference

Percent of
All
Dispositions
in Sample

Percent of
Trial /
Hearing by
Judge
Dispositions
in Sample

Difference

0.0%

-3.3%

3.5%

0.0%

-3.5%

88.8%

71.2%

-17.6%

90.9%

77.0%

-13.9%

5.7%

16.9%

11.2%

5.1%

19.6%

14.5%

2.2%

11.9%

9.7%

0.5%

3.3%

2.8%

4. Agreed Judgments

138

Agreed judgments, particularly in the FY 2015 data, differ from the
other two outcome categories in that outcomes are more proportional to
total case volumes by court, as shown in Table 7 below. In FY 2015,
courts with above zero percent and less than twenty-five percent of the
138. Agreed judgment is the name used to describe a disposition in “cases in which the court
entered a judgment based upon the mutual agreement of the parties involved in the suit.” Office of
Court Admin., Tex. Judiciary Council, Official Justice of the Peace Monthly Report
Instructions 15 (2015).
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agreed judgment outcomes in the sample made up 98.1% of dispositions
and 98.1% of agreed judgments. The FY 2014 rates were only slightly
different for the same court grouping.
Table 8: Agreed Judgment Outcome Rate Analysis by Court
Groupings
Court
Agreed
Judgment
Rates
Agreed
Judgments
as a Percent
of Total
Dispositions

FY 2014

FY 2015

Percent of
All
Dispositions
in Sample

Percent of
Agreed
Judgment
Dispositions
in Sample

Difference

Percent of
All
Dispositions
in Sample

Percent of
Agreed
Judgment
Dispositions
in Sample

Difference

Courts with
a 0%
Agreed
Judgment
Rate

2.1%

0.0%

-2.1%

1.2%

0.0%

-1.2%

Courts
Agreed
Judgment
Rate of
>0%–
>25%

95.5%

94.0%

-1.5%

98.1%

98.1%

0.0%

Courts
Agreed
Judgment
Rate of
25%–50%

2.4%

5.9%

3.6%

0.7%

1.8%

1.2%

Courts
Agreed
Judgment
Rate of
>50%

0.0%

0.0%

0.0%

0.0%

0.0%

0.0%

This analysis of court outcomes, examining a two-year comparison
of the four most common outcomes, demonstrates that outcomes are not
evenly distributed across all courts. Certain outcomes tend to be
concentrated in particular courts or precincts. The following Subpart
explores demographics as a possible explanation of the disproportionate
outcomes observed.
D. Examining Impacts of Race and Income Characteristics on Court
Outcomes
Disparities in outcomes at the court level in other states have been
associated with differences in the demographic characteristics of the
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139

jurisdiction. A recent study looking at the number and locations of
defendants in debt collection court judgments in the St. Louis area,
Chicago, and Newark found twice the rate of judgments in African
American communities than it found in majority White communities
140
when controlling for income. Other studies focus on disproportionately
141
negative collections outcomes in lower income communities. However,
the Texas data paint a somewhat different picture.
The forty counties sampled in this study largely reflect the
142
demographics of the state. The overall population of the forty-county
sample is forty-two percent White, twelve percent African American,
thirty-nine percent Latino, and four percent Asian, with a median
143
household income of $57,000 and seventeen percent poverty rate.
To assess the impact of demographic and household characteristics
on court outcomes, the study uses data from the 2010 U.S. Census and
the 2008–2012 American Community Survey Five Year Estimate. The
study compiled the data at the precinct level and compared it with case
144
outcome rates in the court or courts in the precinct. Table 9 shows the
results of a correlation analysis at the precinct level between each of the
145
court outcomes and the demographic, household, and income data.

139. See, e.g., Legal Aid Soc’y et al., Debt Deception: How Debt Buyers Abuse the Legal
System to Prey on Lower-Income New Yorkers 2 (2010) (studying debt collections suits in New
York City and finding that sixty-nine percent of people sued by debt buyers were low-income Latinos
or African Americans).
140. Paul Kiel & Annie Waldman, The Color of Debt: How Collection Suits Squeeze Black
Neighborhoods, ProPublica (Oct. 8, 2015), https://www.propublica.org/article/debt-collection-lawsuitssqueeze-black-neighborhoods.
141. A 2008 study found strong correlations between poverty and unemployment and the log of
civil filings measures used in the study. See Richard M. Hynes, Broke but Not Bankrupt: Consumer
Debt Collection in State Courts, 60 Fla. L. Rev. i, 41–42 (2008).
142. The median income for the sample is higher than the state average, as is the poverty rate,
perhaps because the sample captures urban communities with both greater wealth and greater poverty
than the state average.
143. According to the 2010 U.S. Census, Texas is 45% White, 12% African American, 38% Latino,
and 4% Asian. See American Fact Finder, supra note 119. According to the 2008–2012 American
Community Survey, median household income for Texas is $51,563, and the poverty rate is 13.5%.
2008–2012 American Community Survey 5-Year Estimates, supra note 12.
144. The demographic and household variables used in this study were selected based on a
preliminary county-based study completed in the spring of 2014, with six months of court outcome
data.
145. As part of this study, percent male householder, percent female householder, and percent
below poverty were examined, in addition to the variables included in the table. They were not
included in the final analysis, because percent male householder and percent female householder did
not show any robust correlations with the court outcomes in the study. Percent below poverty, in the
2015 data, did show a statistically significant negative correlation of .32 with nonsuit/dismissed by
plaintiff category. It is not included in this analysis, because median income, which is a similar variable
and is included in the final analysis, had a more robust outcome. Both correlations point to a trend of a
higher likelihood of nonsuit or dismissed by plaintiff in higher income precincts.
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Table 9: Correlations of Race and Income Characteristics with FY
146
2014 and FY 2015 Court Outcomes
Percent White

Percent
African
American

Percent
Hispanic

Percent
Asian

Median
Income (2012)

Year

2014

2015

2014

2015

2014

2015

2014

2015

2014

2015

Percent
Default
Judgment

-.03

-.25**

0.0

.05

.03

.21**

.03

.06

0.0

-.05

Percent
Agreed
Judgment

.02

.12*

-.11

-.24**

.03

.00

-.02

-.07

.04

.07

Percent
Trial/
Hearing
by Judge

-.12

-.04

.06

.14*

.10

-.05

-.03

.01

-.22**

-.21**

Percent
Trial
by Jury

-.17**

.07

0.0

.14*

.18**

-.12*

-.05

-.06

-.08

.02

Percent
Dismissed
for Want
of Pros.

.06

.07

-.07

-.03

-.01

-.04

-.08

-.09

.02

0.0

Percent
Nonsuit or
Dismissed
by
Plaintiff

.06

.17*

-.09

-.23**

-.04

-.08

.11

.13*

.30**

.40**

% Other

-.04

.03

.15*

.14*

-.09

-.07

-.08

-.09

-.16**

-.13*

*Significant at the 0.1 level; **Significant at the 0.05 level.

Although some correlations are statistically significant at the .1 or
.05 level, for the most part, the variables have a low level of correlation
with the outcomes. Median income appears to have the strongest
correlation with the court outcome category of nonsuited or dismissed by
plaintiff. From 2014 to 2015, the correlation increased from .30 to .40.
The trend in correlation points to a pattern: the rate of nonsuits or
dismissals increases as precinct median income increases. The 2015 data
in Table 9 also shows a negative correlation of .25 between the
percentage of White population in a precinct and the percentage of
default judgment case outcomes, indicating a somewhat higher likelihood
of default judgments in precincts with a higher non-White population.

146. This correlation analysis included 167 precincts for the 2014 analysis and 174 precincts in the
2015 analysis.
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This finding, which is consistent with other studies that show race as a
significant factor in negative outcomes in debt collection proceedings, is
148
not reflected in 2014 data. Based on this analysis, race and income
appear to have a small role in explaining disproportionate court
outcomes. Unfortunately, their role appears to be more significant in
2015, and this is a trend that should be watched.
E. Examining Courts as a Variable Affecting Outcomes
The data do not offer specific information about practices by court.
A comparative examination of outcomes focused on courts with the
highest rates of default judgments and courts with the highest rates of
nonsuits or dismissals by plaintiffs, however, sheds some light on patterns
of outcomes where court practice—such as a judge’s standards for
plaintiffs to document the underlying debt in a debt claim proceeding—
149
could have important impacts on the case outcomes. The data show
that in courts with high rates of default judgments there were lower than
average rates of nonsuits/dismissals by plaintiff. In cases with high rates
of nonsuit or dismissal by plaintiffs, default judgment rates were lower
than average.
Table 10: Outcomes in Courts with High Rates of Default
Judgments and Nonsuited or Dismissed by Plaintiff
Outcome

Courts with >50% Default
Judgment 150

Courts with >50% Nonsuited or
Dismissed by Plaintiff 151

2014

2015

2014

2015

Default Judgments

61.0%

56.9%

15.1%

24.9%

Nonsuited or
Dismissed by Plaintiff

19.9%

26.8%

58.3%

54.5%

All Other*

19.2%

16.3%

26.6%

20.6%

*Includes agreed judgments, trial/hearing by judge, trial by jury, dismissed for want of prosecution,
and other dispositions.

147. See e.g., supra notes 139–38; see e.g., infra note 165.
148. An analysis that looked at the correlations of the number of judgments per 1000 of population
with demographic and household characteristics supported the connection between median income
and nonsuit/dismissal, but did not find a statistically significant correlation between default judgments
and race.
149. See supra note 75 (documenting the standards in the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure 508.2 for
documenting a debt in Texas justice courts). However, the way the standards are applied can vary
from court to court, as demonstrated through court observations discussed later in Part IV below.
150. The 2014 and 2015 data each include data from fifteen courts with default judgment rates
above fifty percent.
151. The 2014 data includes data from twenty-six courts with a nonsuit or dismissal by plaintiff rate
of above fifty percent. The 2015 data includes data from twenty-nine courts with a nonsuit or dismissal
by plaintiff rate of above fifty percent.
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There are multiple possible explanations for this finding. For
example, fewer default judgments might result from higher rates of
appearance by the defendant. Higher appearance rates might relate to
the amount and quality of information the collector or court makes
available to the consumer. Fewer default judgments even in the absence
of a defendant’s appearance might also mean that courts are holding
debt collectors to higher evidentiary standards to prove the debt, leading
to higher rates of nonsuit or dismissal when the evidence falls short.
These interpretations, as well as others, suggest that the individual court
in which a case is heard is a determinant in its outcome.
In order to better understand the litigation of debt claim cases in
specific courts, we considered additional factors that might explain
differences in outcomes. First, we supervised 156 court observations by
volunteer lawyers and law students in justice courts in five counties. We
also explored the websites for the courts in those counties to determine
whether differences in court management, including available resources
for the litigants might explain the differences in outcomes. The next Part
explores the findings obtained from these data sources.
IV. Courtroom Conduct and Other Factors Affecting Collection
Litigation
Courtroom observations occurred in Collin, Dallas, El Paso,
Tarrant, and Travis counties in the summer of 2014, before the first
anniversary of the new rules. At the outset, it should be noted that
observers did not match the proceedings they attended to the statistical
data obtained from the court, which was analyzed in the previous Part.
Rather, the proceedings observed were selected at the convenience of
the observer and were not selected according to any identifiable pattern.
Observers recorded their observations in thirty-two categories that
corresponded roughly to the categories of information sought in the 2011
152
Study to allow us to make general comparisons with the previous data.
Data recorded included the identity of the parties and their attorneys,
whether the parties appeared, the amount of the claim, whether the
plaintiff was the original creditor, and the outcome in addition to
153
comments made by the observer on the process.
Together with
information obtained from court websites, the observations provided
additional insight into collection litigation in the justice courts.
A. Differences Among the Court Proceedings
Observers found many judges actively involved in the disposition of
cases on the docket. In some cases, judges cautioned consumers to make
152. Spector, supra note 12, at 277–78.
153. See 2014 Court Observation Data, supra note 14.
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sure to read settlement documents before signing. In others, judges
appeared to freely continue the proceedings to enable the parties to
155
finalize a settlement, provide a plaintiff additional time to obtain
evidence of the debt, or to allow a defendant additional time to show the
156
debt was not hers. In some courts, it is the practice that judges handled
157
all potential defaults in chambers. In another, the observer reported
that the judge expressed frustration with the failure of both parties to
appear and was considering taking a more strict view of both parties’
158
failure to appear.
Some observers reported frank discussions with judges about the
effectiveness of the new rules. One observer reported a judge’s opinion
159
that he “doesn’t think having special debt collection rules make sense.”
Another reported an opposite view, stating that the new rules provided
judges with effective tools to ensure plaintiffs presented sufficient
160
evidence to support their claims. Yet another expressed the view that
161
the new rules made it easier for collectors to recover a judgment. One
observer opined that the process “needs some improvement” and
162
commented that the “system is designed for those who show up.” He
added that the debtor’s failure to appear might be a symptom of a larger
163
problem.
B. Justice Is Speedy
Consistent with the statistical data, observers reported that very few
cases were resolved through a formal hearing or trial. Instead, court
observers found a variety of types of hearings being conducted. They
included pre-trial hearings, hearings for post-judgment discovery, requests
for continuances, discovery motions, and motions to transfer or dismiss on
grounds of venue or bankruptcy. Regardless of the type of hearings
observed, 90% of the proceedings were completed in less than fifteen
minutes, and 63% in less than five minutes. Only one hearing extended
beyond thirty minutes.

154. Id. at l. 15.
155. Id. at l. 16.
156. Id. at l. 14 (defendant given additional time).
157. Reported in student observations (Summer 2015).
158. Exit memorandum from Student to Professor Mary Spector (Summer 2014) (on file with
authors).
159. Memorandum from Ryan Snow on Debt Collection to Ann Baddour et al. (Aug. 13, 2014)
(on file with authors).
160. Memorandum from Ryan Durham on Discussion with Judge Michael Windham to Mary
Spector (Oct. 14, 2014) (on file with authors).
161. Memorandum from Michael F. Steve (Aug. 19, 2014) (on file with authors).
162. Memorandum from Matthew Gilleland on Debt Collection to Mary Spector et al. (Aug. 27,
2014) (on file with authors).
163. Id.

Spector-Baddour_20 (Dukanovic).DOC (Do Not Delete)

1462

6/19/2016 12:20 PM

[Vol. 67:1427

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

Table 11: Length of Proceedings (Values)
Defendant
Present
Yes Pro
Se
Yes
Attorney
No

164

<5 mins

5–10
mins

11–15
mins

16–20
mins

21–30
mins

30–60
mins

Unknown

36

11

4

3

1

0

0

37.11%

35.48%

36.36%

50.00%

33.33%

0.00%

0.00%

18

5

1

0

1

0

1

18.56%

16.13%

9.09%

0.00%

33.33%

0.00%

20.00%

43

15

6

3

1

1

4

44.33%

48.39%

54.55%

50.00%

33.33%

100.00%

80.00%

C. Defendants Appear in Court
Defendants appeared in fifty-two percent of the cases observed,
165
higher than reported in other studies. Because courts can dispose of
cases without a hearing when defendants do not appear, it might be
expected that most of the cases observed were ones in which the
defendant had made an appearance at some point in the litigation. Still,
the appearance rate was more than twice the rate found in the 2011
166
Study.
The presence of the defendant at the hearing seemed to result in a
higher likelihood of success for the defendant or, at the very least, a
lower rate of success for the plaintiff. In the fifty-four cases in which a
defendant appeared pro se, three of the defendants were non-English
speakers without translators, two claimed the debt was not theirs, three
reported issues related to divorce associated with debt. Five of the
defendants were offered and accepted payment plans, and four admitted
they could not pay. In five of the seven cases in which a pro se defendant
prevailed, the plaintiff failed to appear.
In cases in which the defendant appeared with an attorney, the
likelihood of the defendant’s success was greater. In cases coded as
“neither won,” observations revealed a range of outcomes. For example,
some resulted in continuances, five were set for trial at a later date, and
one resulted in the granting of a motion for pretrial discovery.

164. Percentages represent proportion of each form of representation for a certain range of length
of proceedings.
165. See Peter A. Holland, Junk Justice: A Statistical Analysis of 4,400 Lawsuits Filed by Debt
Buyers, 26 Loy. Consumer L. Rev. 179, 183, 226 (2014) (reporting typical default judgment rates of
seventy-three to ninety-five percent as identified in various studies of court litigation throughout the
country).
166. Spector, supra note 12, at 288.
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Table 12: Defendant Present Versus Who Won

167

Defendant
Present

Plaintiff
Won

Defendant
Won

Neither

Settled
Before

Unknown

Yes Pro Se

52.73%

12.73%

27.27%

7.27%

0.00%

Yes Attorney

15.38%

26.92%

50.00%

7.69%

0.00%

No

75.34%

4.11%

8.22%

5.48%

6.85%

D. Court Websites
One explanation for a heightened level of consumer participation in
the cases observed is the quality and ease of information available to the
consumer. Whether such information comes from the court or the
collector, it is believed that more information about the individual
lawsuit, as well as about the litigation process in general, leads to higher
168
levels of consumer participation.
As one measure of the quantity and quality of information available
to consumers, we examined the websites of each of the counties in which
we observed a court, as well as the websites of each individual court
observed. The results were as varied as the proceedings observed and
suggest the possibility that information inconsistencies might contribute
to the disparate outcomes observed in the data.
Each of the counties reviewed provide links to the statutory text of
169
the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure that govern justice court litigation.
Beyond links to the statutory language, however, individual courts and
counties varied greatly in the quality and quantity of information
provided to litigants. Very few courts offered interactive or other webbased materials for litigants. All courts in Travis County and one court in
Collin County provided a “Guide and File for Pro Se Litigants” link
directing users to “efiletexas.gov,” a web application electronic filing of
170
petitions in Small Claims, Evictions, and Repair and Remedy cases.
The site lacked any comparable options for self-represented defendants
seeking to dispute a plaintiff’s claim and protect their rights, and had no
options of any kind for plaintiffs or defendants in debt claim cases.
The primary websites for Bexar, El Paso, and Dallas Counties, and
the remaining Collin County justice courts lacked any information or
instructions for pro se litigants other than links to the Texas Rules of
Civil Procedure.

167. Percentages represent proportion of each case outcome for each form of representation.
168. See Fed. Trade Comm’n, Broken System, supra note 19.
169. See Final Approval of Rules for Justice Court Cases, supra note 66.
170. Guide and File for Pro Se Litigants, Travis County TX, https://www.traviscountytx.gov/
justices-of-peace/guide-file-for-pro-se-litigants (last visited May 29, 2016); Justices of the Peace, Collin
County, http://www.collincountytx.gov/justices_peace/Pages/default.aspx (last visited May 29, 2016).
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In all of the counties surveyed, some courts provided online forms,
including debt claim petitions, but other information and forms varied
171
from county to county and from court to court within the county.
Collin County provides links to twenty-two different forms, including
petitions for the four claims over which Texas justice courts retain
jurisdiction, a generic Original Answer to all claims, and fifteen other
172
forms. In Collin, El Paso, and Bexar counties, debt claim petitions are
available on the main Justice Court webpage. On the other hand, in
Dallas and Travis County, form petitions are provided on the websites of
only some of the precincts, but not in others. Four of the ten Dallas
County precincts provide forms for debt claim petitions and Original
173
Answers. In El Paso County, six of the eight individual court websites
174
provide forms including debt collection petitions and original answers.
While the six form answers vary from court to court, the remaining two
175
precincts do not provide form answers at all.
Differences in the existence and quality of information available to
justice court litigants including consumer defendants in just five Texas
176
counties suggest the inconsistencies are not isolated. They may contribute
to inequities that exist among frequent users of courts and others as well as
some of the disproportionate outcomes observed in the data.
V. Summary Findings and Recommendations
This study attempts to provide a snapshot of the collection practices
employed in Texas over the last two years. It examines the snapshot
through a lens that has witnessed rigorous enforcement of consumer
protections in the collection process at the national level as well as
changes in court rules at state level. Though data is not available to reach
171. Petition: Debt Claim Case, Bexar County, http://home.bexar.org/jp/docs/PETITION_
DEBT_CLAIM%20CASE.pdf (last visited May 29, 2016); Petition: Debt Claim Case, Collin County,
http://www.collincountytx.gov/justices_peace/Documents/debt_claim_petition.pdf (last visited May 29,
2016); Plaintiff’s Original Petition, Travis County, https://www.traviscountytx.gov/images/
justices_of_peace/Doc/debt-small-claim-jp2.pdf (last visited May 29, 2016); Petition: Debt Claim Case,
El Paso County, http://www.epcounty.com/jp/documents/El%20Paso%20Debt%20Claim%20Petition.pdf
(last visited May 29, 2016); Justice Court Civil Case Information Sheet, Dallas County,
http://www.dallascounty.org/department/jpcourts/12/documents/DebtClaimPetition_020314_NEW.pdf
(last visited May 29, 2016).
172. Justices of the Peace: Forms, Collin County, http://www.collincountytx.gov/justices_peace/
Pages/jpforms.aspx (last visited May 29, 2016).
173. Defendant’s Original Answer, Dallas County, http://www.dallascounty.org/department/jpcourts/12/documents/090113_JS_JX_ANSWER.pdf (last visited May 29, 2016) (citing to precincts and places 1-2, 2-1,
3-1, 4-2).
174. Justices of the Peace, El Paso County, http://www.epcounty.com/jp/jp2.htm (last visited May
29, 2016).
175. Defendant’s Original Answer, supra note 173 (citing to precincts and places 1, 4, 5, 6-1, 6-2, 7).
176. The Authors expanded their investigation to include at least twelve counties and their
ongoing research supports this assertion. They expect to publish the results of their expanded research
by late summer 2016.
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firm conclusions regarding changes in court outcomes for consumers,
some trends can be identified.
A. Debt Collection Problems Continue to Plague Texans
Texas consumers continue to report the existence of unwanted
communication and unlawful conduct by debt collectors, including
attempts to collect debts not owed. They also report conduct that appears to
mirror the conduct of collectors of imposter or scam debt. The pervasiveness
of this conduct calls for increased enforcement of existing law, and if
necessary the promulgation of new law to safeguard consumers’ private
personal and financial information.
B. Debt Collection Litigation Continues to Grow in Texas Despite
a Slowdown in Other Areas of the Country
Litigation to collect consumer debt grew by more than twenty
percent over the two-year period examined. While the number of cases
increased, so too did the courts’ ability to dispose of the case, which grew
by eighty-one percent. To the extent new rules of court procedures were
designed to promote efficiency, they could be considered successful.
However, there is no evidence to suggest that the rules offer consumers
any additional protection to “the inherent problems in these suits,
177
including an often disturbing lack of proof.” Indeed, to the extent that
the default judgment rate increased slightly over the two-year period, the
conclusion might be just the opposite.
C. Texas Debtors Appear to Fare Better in Court Proceedings
178
Compared to Debtors in Other States, but They Do Not
Necessarily Fare Well
A possible explanation of the lower than average default judgment
rates is the protection against wage garnishment from most creditors and
the existence of broad personal property exemptions, leaving many Texans
essentially judgment proof. Because of these important protections, debt
collectors are likely more discerning about the cases that they bring to
court.
Though default judgment rates are low compared to other states,
default judgments still account for nearly one in three of all debt claim
court outcomes in Texas. Given the well-documented problems of some
collectors filing debt claim cases without sufficient documentation of the
debt, a thirty percent default judgment rate raises serious concerns.
The implications for consumers of the relatively high rates of cases
nonsuited or dismissed by plaintiff are difficult to decipher. Cases
177. See Tucker, supra note 67, at 9.
178. See Fed. Trade Comm’n, Broken System, supra note 19.
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dismissed without prejudice, might indicate short-term relief, but
179
potential negative impacts in the long term. On the positive side, the
high dismissal rate might indicate either that borrowers are engaged
enough in the proceedings to discredit the validity of the debt or judges
are scrutinizing the debt documentation and finding that it does not meet
the legal threshold to proceed. However, to the extent that such
dispositions are made without prejudice to the plaintiff, it also suggests
that borrowers remain susceptible to future claims based on the same
debt.
D. Court-Specific Data Shows a Picture of Disparate Outcomes at
the Court Level
The substantial variations in outcomes from court to court reveal
that each of the outcomes is disproportionately over or underrepresented
by court grouping. Notably, the magnitude of the disproportionate
outcomes decreased from 2014 to 2015, which could indicate a positive
trend toward consistency in how courts apply the new debt claim case
standards. However, important disparities still exist in outcomes at the
court level. With the exception of the “Agreed Judgment” outcome
category, the data reflect a decreasing, but ongoing pattern of disparate
outcomes based on the court. For a consumer, it could mean a higher
likelihood of a particular outcome based solely on the court in which a
case is filed. This dynamic can work to the consumer’s benefit or
detriment depending on the court. Ideally, consumers should expect
consistent, balanced outcomes court to court.
E. The Quality and Quantity of Information Available to
Consumers by the Courts Must Be Improved
Differences in the existence and quality of information available to
justice, court litigants including consumer-defendants in just five Texas
counties suggest the information inequities are not isolated. They might
not only contribute to inequities that already exist among frequent users
of courts and others, but they might also contribute to some of the
disproportionate outcomes observed in the data. Detailed analysis of the
quality and quantity of information available to consumers is beyond the
scope of this Article, however, we believe more research is necessary to
determine the role that such information might play and to identify best
practices to ensure access to justice for all Texans.

179. Only two percent of dismissed debt cases were dismissed with prejudice. See Spector, supra
note 12, at 7. In the Spring 2014 Supervisory Highlights examining debt collection, “Examiners found
that in 70% of the cases, when the consumer filed an answer, the entity [debt collector] would dismiss
the suit because it was unable to locate documentation to support its claims.” See supra note 133.
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The precinct level demographic analysis is instructive. Though a
more granular analysis looking at actual debt claims cases filed by census
tract or address of the defendant could lead to other findings, the lack of
any strong influence of demographics or income at the precinct level is a
positive finding. Again, the strong debtor protections from asset and
wage garnishment in Texas likely play an important role in this finding
and could provide one explanation for differences we see in Texas as
compared to other states.
Conclusion
In sum, debt collections, Texas-style, are a mixed bag. Families
report numerous complaints about threats and intimidation in the
collection process, disrupting their lives at home and at work. On the
other hand, consumers seem to fare better in Texas courtrooms than
consumers in other states. Still there remains substantial room for
improvement. Rigorous enforcement of existing debtor protections at
the state and federal level should continue as regulators and lawmakers
develop clear rules that define the boundaries of permissible conduct
both in and out of the courtroom. Effective enforcement together with
responsible regulation can enhance protections for consumers, while
protecting legitimate debt collection conduct. Reform efforts at the
federal and state levels should also include steps to increase the quantity
and quality of information provided to consumers at all stages of the
collection process—from the initial contact by the collector, through the
conclusion of any litigation to collect the debt. Courts should not be
passive participants in this process. They are important and necessary
actors and must actively work to ensure effective and meaningful access
to justice for all.

